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Abstract
Several studies have commented on the emergence of a new inter-
national monetary system in the post-Asian crisis years. The current
international nancial crisis has, however, put Bretton Woods II under
considerable strain. This paper analyzes the sustainability of the pre-
crisis order from an emerging country perspective. A simple framework in
which agents have a choice between nancial and real assets is constructed
in order to explore possible consequences of the shocks that emerging
economies are currently experiencing. Stock and ow implications are
analyzed. Assuming that recent events would have reinforced monetary
authoritiesdesire to maintain an adequate cushion of reserves while pre-
venting exchange rate volatility, we nd that the response to most shocks
would involve running continuous current account surpluses, that is, a
continuation of a crucial aspect of Bretton Woods II. Given political and
economic constraints, is such a continuation feasible? A preliminary ex-
ploration raises serious doubts and skims alternatives.
JEL Codes: F02, F32, G01, F55
Keywords: Bretton Woods II, emerging economies, reserve accumulation,
precautionary motives, mercantilism.
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Bretton Woods II and the Emerging Economies:
Lazarus, Phoenix, or Humpty Dumpty?
1 Introduction
The ongoing nancial - and now increasingly, real - sector crisis that originated in
the United States is presently the center of much academic and policy discussion.
How and why did the crisis originate? Where is the world headed? Is it going
to be a V-shaped, U-shaped, or L-shaped recession? Has the recession already
turned into a depression? While these questions have mainly been explored
from an industrialized country perspective, concerns are rising regarding the
consequences for income growth, poverty reduction, and socio-political stability
in developing countries. These concerns assume added importance in the light
of a not-so-distant history of sudden stop episodes in these countries.
Capital ows to emerging economies are projected to decline from 928 billion
dollars in 2007 to 165 billion dollars in 2009 (Institute of International Finance,
2009). This decline will either have to be reected in declining currency values,
greater current account surpluses, foreign exchange reserve losses or some combi-
nation thereof. Much recent analysis of developments in developing countries,
however, tends to focus on the sharp decline in global trade and the conse-
quences for the developing economies that have pursued export-led growth in
recent years.1 The focus on the short-run trade e¤ects is understandable. How-
ever, changes in ows today translate into changes in stocks over time. Can
developing countries continue to maintain stable external accounts? What are
some of the likely consequences of various measures currently being undertaken
to arrest the decline in emerging market output? Would countries resort to
capital controls in the pursuit of recession-ghting monetary and exchange rate
policies in a replay of the 1930s?2 Would the international system that emerges
after the dust has settled be able to maintain the pre-crises status quo with a
number of developing countries pursuing export-led growth and current account
surpluses? Does the world require a global lender of last resort to mitigate some
of the destabilizing features of the pre-crisis years?
This study carries out a preliminary exploration of these issues. In doing so,
we limit our analysis to the so-called emerging economies.3 These economies
1 Indeed, insofar as capital accounts are concerned, there has been a much greater focus on
the US in particular, and industrialized countries in general, China (and perhaps East Asia)
being a major developing country exception. See, for example, Blanchard et al. (2005) and
other papers in the special 2005 issue of Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.
2See Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) for a very interesting discusion of exchange rate policies
and controls in the 1930s.
3The group, which we have dened following Obstfeld et al. (2008), includes Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philip-
pines, Poland, the Russian Federation, Singapore, the Slovak Republic, South Africa, Thai-
land, Turkey, Venezuela. However, some of the stylized features of our model in Section 3 may
t one subset of these countries better than the other subset. For example, massive reserve
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are, on average, higher on the income and industrialization ladder than the
developing country group as a whole, and tend to have relatively advanced
nancial and economic institutions. Most of the global imbalances that have
emerged in recent years have originated in interactions between these countries
and the industrialized world.4
We contribute to the existing analysis of global economic developments by
exploring these issues in a simple formal framework that focuses on emerging
economies and incorporates both stock and ow considerations. The central
bank, in this model, attempts to maintain both exchange rate and reserve sta-
bility while letting go of the third leg of the widely-cited impossible trilemma.
After having concluded that continued pursuit of competitive exchange rates
and insurance through foreign exchange reserves is likely to threaten the sus-
tainability of the global nancial system on economic and political grounds, we
briey discuss practical alternatives
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some sta-
tistics and discusses relevant aspects of the current global situation from an
emerging economy perspective. Section 3 develops a simple stylized frame-
work, inspired by Dornbusch (1975), to help carry out thought experiments and
explore interesting interactions between the real and nancial sides of the econ-
omy. Comparative static and dynamic exercises are carried out to analyze the
possible impact of changes in the domestic and external environment. Section 4
discusses relevant implications in the current global context before concluding.
2 Background
Recent years have seen developing countries as a group run substantial current
account surpluses with the industrialized country group for almost a decade.5
The group of emerging economies has contributed signicantly to these sur-
pluses. Moreover, these economies have run overall balance of payments sur-
pluses with the rest of the world. Figure 1 reects these developments.6 The
current account recovered quickly following the Asian crisis of 1997-98 and the
global recession in 2001. In recent years current account surpluses have been
accompanied by capital account surpluses as foreign private capital has poured
into these rapidly growing economies. The ip side of the overall balance of
payment surpluses, of course, has been the increase in foreign exchange reserve
accumulation and current account decits have been associated more closely with the the
Asian and Latin American countries in our sample than with the central and east European
countries.
4Although oil exporters, of course, have been another major player in this regard. Our
sample includes at least three large exporters of oil, Mexico, Russia and Venezuela.
5See International Monetary Fund (2008).
6The exchange rate, current account, capital account, foreign reserves (minus gold), and
GDP data used in this study were obtained from the International Monetary Funds Interna-
tional Financial Statistics database, with the exception of Mexico, Russia, and South Africa
for which GDP data were not available from that source and had to be obtained from the
World Banks World Development Indicators instead.
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holdings by central banks to historically unprecedented levels, both in absolute
terms and in terms of gross domestic product (see Figure 2).7
Concurrent with the pursuit of a bigger foreign exchange cushion have been
e¤orts by central banks to stabilize their currencies, often at levels that are
consistent with current account surpluses. While several emerging economies
have moved from xed exchange rate regimes to managed oating, and have also
become increasingly integrated into global nancial markets, currency market
intervention remains the norm rather than the exception, especially when it
comes to avoiding large appreciations. Levi-Yeyati and Sturzeneggar (2007)
term this the fear of oating in reverse. Similarly, Aizenman et al. (2009)
nd that developing countries have recently been converging towards a middle
groundwith managed exchange rate exibility backed by sizeable international
reserves and medium levels of monetary independence and nancial integration.
Even countries that have de jure oats do not necessarily leave the exchange
rate (and by extension, o¢ cial reserve transactions) unmanaged. For example,
in a famous study known for coining the term fear of oating, Calvo and
Reinhart (2002) found that countries that claim to adhere to a oating regime
often in practice do not. Many countries are not able or willing to x or
oat completely due to shallow nancial markets and because exchange rate
changes can have a major impact on ination, balance sheets, and economic
growth. Rose (2007), in a study that describes the pre-2008 global system as
Bretton Woods reversed, nds that reserve accumulation in countries that target
ination as a monetary anchor (and hence typically have more exchange rate
exibility) does not look di¤erent from other countries. A recent comprehensive
analysis of the issue by Frankel and Wei (2008) nds that the fear of oating
is well and alive, and that declared oaters often intervene heavily to stabilize
exchange rates.
In accordance with this evidence, Table 1 shows that the accumulation of
huge war chests of reserves has not been limited to the countries that x or peg
their exchange rates. In the interest of brevity, we have collapsed distinctions
between the various sub-categories within managed oating and pegs. The
regimes are reported in ascending order of exibility. A priori, one would ex-
pect the average reserve-GDP ratio to decline as we move down the column.
However, a quick glance at the Table makes it obvious that while this expec-
tation is justied at the polar extremes, the relationship between the nature
of the exchange rate regime and the level of reserves as a proportion of GDP
is not monotonic. Thus, economies with pegged exchange rates maintained,
as an average proportion of GDP, a smaller holding of reserves in comparison
with managed oats.8 These nuances aside, most countries continued to com-
7The relative weights of two possible underlying motives, i.e., insurance against sudden
stops and currency mismatches versus the maintenance of undervalued exchange rates with
export-led growth as the objective, is a matter of much debate. See, for example, Aizenman
and Lee (2007) and Dooley P. et al. (2003) for opposing perspectives. We avoid this contro-
versy for now, assuming instead that both motives have mattered. See Section 4 for more
discussion.
8This is partly a function of the fact that many countries switch back and forth between
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bine some genre of managed oating with relatively high reserve holdings. A
lower degree of exchange rate xing does not seem to preclude o¢ cial reserve
transactions to accumulate a re wall of reserves.
Current global circumstances create an added incentive for managing ex-
change rates since access to international credit is shrinking just when this
credit is required to dampen large uncontrolled devaluations. Figure 3 illus-
trates recent exchange rate volatility for a subset of emerging economies. The
exchange rate here is dened in the standard way as the domestic currency price
of foreign currency and the shaded portion highlights the post-December 2007
period. Increasing global turmoil has a¤ected emerging economy currencies in
a major way. For example, the Korean Won experienced a depreciation of 50
percent between December 2007 and November 2008, most of it occurring after
September 2008 when global markets went into ight to safetymode following
the Lehman Brothers debacle. While the Korean case is the most dramatic one,
other countries such as South Africa, Turkey, Chile, and Pakistan experienced
sharp declines in the value of their currency. However, some countries have
since managed to somewhat stabilize their currencies, partially through o¢ cial
intervention by the monetary authorities.9
As mentioned earlier, some attention has been paid recently among media
and policy circles to the rapid shrinkage of emerging market exports and capital
inows. One of the interesting questions that arises in this context is whether
building up huge reserve cushions for the rainy day has helped countries so far,
now that that day seems to have arrived? While it is too early to speculate,
preliminary evidence in this regard is interesting. If reserve accumulation was
at least partly motivated by the need to insure against a free fall in the currency
following a sudden stop, then the strategy seems to have had some success. Fig-
ure 4 displays the scatter plot of the reserves-to-GDP ratio for each country in
2007 plotted against the percent change in the currency values between Decem-
ber 2007 and November 2008. The dates were chosen so as to avoid the issue
of reverse causality from exchange rate changes to reserve accumulation. For
example, nominal and real devaluation may lead to current account surpluses,
which may, in turn, lead to reserve accumulation. Since our aim is to explore
the e¢ cacy of reserve accumulation as a re wall against sudden collapses in
exchange rates, we want to focus exclusively on the links running from reserve
levels to exchange rate changes. The tted line has a negative slope, the uncon-
ditional correlation coe¢ cient being -0.49. Countries that had higher reserves
entering the crisis period su¤ered lower declines in their exchange rates.
Recently, Obstfeld et al. (2008) have argued that countries accumulate re-
regimes. The more important consideration from our perspective, however, is the number of
countries that have switched between independent oating on the one hand and some kind of
managed oating, pegging, or xed exchange rates on the other. This number appears to be
low.
9Of the 25 countries for which data are available for Dec. 2008, 22 depreciated between
December 2007 and November 2008, while only 8 depreciated between November and Decem-
ber 2008. The average unweighted depreciation for these countries was about 16 percent over
the former period. During the latter period, on the other hand, these currencies appreciated
by one percent, on average.
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serves in order to forestall a double drain; the drain that results from sudden
stops of external inows and the drain that results as domestic residents with-
draw domestic currency deposits and convert them into foreign currency hold-
ings. This suggests that the larger the size of a central banks liabilities (crudely
proxied by M2), the greater the reserve cushion required. By accumulating re-
serves, the monetary authority seeks to insure against the threat of a bank run
combining with a currency run. Looking at things from this perspective, a
better measure of the degree of insurance achieved by a country would be the
ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves.10 Figure 5 presents a scatter plot
of the value of this variable for each country in 2007 against the percentage
change in that countrys exchange rate between December 2007 and November
2008. Consistent with the conclusion derived from Figure 4, the tted line
has a positive slope, the unconditional correlation coe¢ cient between the two
series being 0.37. More detailed econometric analysis by Obstfeld et al. (2009)
concludes that a countrys reserve holdings just before the current crisis relative
to the level of holdings predicted by these nancial motives (i.e., a dual run on
the nancial sector) predict both advanced and emerging country exchange rate
movements in 2008, with the countries that had large reserves relative to M2
successfully avoiding dramatic depreciations, and some even appreciating.
So far we have looked at the relationship between stock measures and ex-
change rate changes. Flow measures have the added virtue that these allow
us to distinguish between developments on the current and capital accounts.
Figure 6, which plots the average current account as a proportion of GDP over
the period 2003-07 against the percentage change in exchange rates between
December 2007 and November 2008,11 provides a picture similar to our earlier
stock measures. Countries that had current account surpluses tended, on aver-
age, to experience less depreciation (or more appreciation) in the crisis period
(with the correlation coe¢ cient being -0.30). This suggests that current ac-
count surpluses may have facilitated the maintenance of exchange rate stability.
Figure 7, which plots the average capital account as a proportion of GDP over
the period 2003-07 against the percentage change in exchange rates between
December 2007 and November 2008, however, presents an interesting contrast.
Countries that had been running capital account surpluses, on average, in the
pre-crisis period tended to experience greater depreciations in the aftermath
of the crisis (the correlation coe¢ cient being 0.22). This preliminary nding
supports the view that current account surpluses provide a cushion that capital
account surpluses do not, perhaps owing to the volatile nature of the latter.
In sum, while the evidence presented is preliminary and sketchy, it does
provide some basis for understanding the behavior of monetary authorities that
have attempted to target a minimal reserve level for precautionary reasons while
simultaneously targeting the exchange rate for mercantilist ends or to protect
the domestic nancial sector against balance sheet mismatches.
10M2 here is dened as the sum of outstanding currency, and demand, time, savings, and
foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central government.
11The beginning of the period was chosen to avoid the noise emanating from the global
downturn in 2001.
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3 A Stylized Emerging Economy
Consider an emerging economy bloc that has a relatively open capital account.
Our economy, which is small in international markets, produces two goods, a
labor-intensive, internationally traded consumption good and a capital intensive
good that is only traded within the bloc. Investors choose from a menu of three
assets: currency, internationally traded bonds, and equity, i.e., claims on real
capital. Equilibria conditions in the markets for real money balances, bonds,
and equity can be summarized, respectively, as
m = md(r; r   ;w) (1)
b = bd(r; r   ;w) (2)
k = kd(r; r   ;w) (3)
where the left hand side of each equation reects the supply of an asset while the
right hand side reects demand (as captured by the superscript d). All small
case variables are expressed in terms of the consumption good. w denotes the
stock of real wealth, r denotes the domestic returns on capital (which equals the
opportunity cost of capital or the real interest rate), and  is an inverse measure
of the degree of capital controls.12 The presence of capital controls implies
that domestic and foreign assets are imperfect (gross) substitutes. Moreover,
domestic assets too are gross substitutes.
The real exchange rate q is dened as the price of the consumption good
relative to that of the capital good. The total stock of nancial assets is the
sum of real money balances and bonds, to which we need to add the stock of
real assets to get the total stock of domestic wealth.
k = qK (4)
f = m+ b (5)
w = k + f (6)
12The use of capital controls as a short-run policy measure has been seen in action in recent
years (e.g., China throughout this decade, Argentina in 2005, Thailand in 2006, Colombia
in 2007), and in recent months (e.g., Eastern Europe). See Buiter (2009) for a discussion
of ongoing Central and Eastern European measures. One would expect to see more policy
action on this front as the current crisis develops and international capital and trade ows
become more unpredictable.
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Assuming full employment and exible prices,13 general equilibrium Stolper-
Samuelson reasoning implies that the real exchange rate (that is, the relative
price of the capital-intensive good) is a function of the real return on equity.
q = q(r); q0 > 0 (7)
In developing countries with skill and capital shortages and factor market
rigidities, the elasticity of factor substitution is likely to be low, at least in the
short run. This implies that q0 is likely to be low. We maintain this assumption
throughout the remainder of our analysis.
Finally, the monetary authority or central bank is assumed to target both
the nominal exchange rate and the level of international reserves. The pursuit
of both a monetary policy and a pegged exchange rate requires the presence of
some degree of capital controls.
m = R (8)
where R represents foreign exchange reserves with the central bank. Thus,
money supply endogenously responds to the level of reserves that the central
bank aims at maintaining, with o¢ cial reserve transactions playing the role of
determining the availability of real cash balances.14
Equations (1)-(8) can be reduced after substitutions to three excess demand
equations in three unknowns.15
M(b; ; r;) = f   b R = 0 (9)
B(b; ; r;) = bd(r; r   ; q(r)K + f)  b = 0 (10)
L(b; ; r;) = kd(r; r   ; q(r)K + f)  q(r)K = 0 (11)
where  is a vector of exogenous variables and/or parameters. The structure of
our simple model can be explained as follows. The stocks of nancial and real
assets, and hence of domestic wealth are state variables. Given the exchange
rate and reserve targets, equation (9) determines the supply of internationally
traded bonds available to the private sector. Equations (10) and (11) then
determine the degree of capital controls and the return on domestic real assets
required to clear the bond and equity markets. We assume throughout our
analysis that own price elasticities dominate cross-price elasticities.
13Full employment may seem to be a strong assumption but, considering the main objective
of this exercise, it does help simplify matters if we abstract away from issues pertaining to
employment and wage determination. Moreover, near full employment becomes a more
plausible assumption in the context of an emerging economy with few social security benets
or unemployment insurance programs if we think of employment as including both the formal
and informal sectors.
14 In other words, the central bank sells and purchases foreign assets in exchange for currency
in order to maintain its targets.
15Notice that since f is a predetermined variable, only 7 of the eight equations (1)-(8) are
independent.
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Capital accumulation equals new investment net of depreciation .
_K = (q;K)  K = '(r;K); 'i > 0 (12)
where the sign of 'r makes use of equation (7), while that of 'K assumes that
the general equilibrium Rybczynski e¤ect dominates the e¤ect of capital depre-
ciation. The behavioral specication for investment can be directly derived
from equation (12), and expressed as follows:
I = _K + K =  (r;K);  i > 0 (13)
Saving is assumed to be a function of the real interest rate and wealth, the
latter through the Metzler wealth e¤ect. Thus,
S = (r;K; f); r > 0, K , f < 0 (14)
where the direct e¤ect of the real interest rate on savings is assumed to dom-
inate the Metzler channel. Furthermore, due to these o¤setting e¤ects, our
analysis also assumes that the interest rate elasticity of savings is relatively low
(i.e., r <  r). This assumption appears to be consistent with stylized facts.
Precautionary motives tend to play an important role in savings in East and
South East Asian economies. In other words, households appear to target a
certain level of wealth. Moreover, a signicant proportion of investment tends
to originate from retained earnings out of prots (returns on capital). These
characteristics may help explain why investment was relatively low and saving
high in spite of low interest rates in the earlier years of this decade.
Turning to the dynamic behavior of the economy, the national stocks of -
nancial and real assets adjust over the longer run as a result of savings and
investment. The current account surplus is the excess of savings over invest-
ment. By another identity, it also equals in magnitude the sum of capital
account decits and o¢ cial reserve transactions. Thus,
_f = S   I = (r;K; f); i < 0 (15)
where r = r(K; f). Comparative statics exercises lead us to conclude that
rK > 0, while, again assuming that own-price e¤ects dominate, the sign of rf
is ambiguous. The rise in wealth resulting from an increase in the nancial
stock creates excess demand for money, bonds, and equity. The former two
put upward pressure on the rate of return on real assets while the latter has the
opposite e¤ect. We assume that the former e¤ect dominates for two reasons.
Firstly, due to o¤setting e¤ects, making the opposite assumption would require
that the demand for bonds be very sensitive to capital controls. Secondly,
making the latter assumption renders the system unconditionally unstable.
We can now study the dynamic behavior of our system as the stocks of assets
adjust to their long-run values. Our dynamic system can be summarized by
two equations in two state variables, f and k.
_K = (K; f); i > 0 (12)
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_f = (K; f); i < 0 (15)
Equations (12) and (15) yield two cases, one stable and the other saddle
path stable. We call these Case 1 and Case 2, respectively. Figures 8 and 9
illustrate these cases graphically. The negatively sloped dotted line in Figure
9 represents the saddle path. In the interest of brevity, our analysis mostly
focuses on Case 1, although, where interesting, we will also highlight aspects of
the other scenario.
3.1 Comparative Statics and Adjustment to Equilibrium
in the Long Run
In this section, we carry out four short-run comparative static exercises assuming
the stocks of nancial and real assets to be predetermined variables: (1) open
market operations to maintain a higher level of reserves, (2) a policy induced
change in savings, (3) a shift in preference towards internationally traded bonds,
and (4) an increase in the risk-adjusted yield on international bonds. These
experiments attempt to capture either recent economic developments or possible
future economic shocks. Table 2 summarizes the results. We then analyze the
evolution of the current account balance and the capital stock as the economy
adjusts to its long-run steady state in each case.
3.1.1 An increase in the targeted holdings of central bank reserves
Aizenman and Marion (2002) and Aizenman and Lee (2007) have argued that
precautionary savings rather than mercantilism should be seen as the driving
force behind the massive build up of foreign exchange reserves by Asian nations
in the years following 1998.16 Now that global uncertainty has increased, might
emerging countries feel a renewed need to build up precautionary reserves? In
our framework, an increase in the targeted level of foreign exchange reserves is
akin to an expansionary monetary policy. At a given level of wealth, the decline
in bonds available to the public requires stricter capital controls in order to
reduce the incentive to hold bonds in private portfolios. Furthermore, a lower
return to claims on real capital now su¢ ces to induce investors to hold equity.
Put di¤erently, the central bank emits money in exchange for its purchase
of reserves. Capital controls must be tightened and the return on equity must
decline in order to induce agents to hold the extra available cash. The current
account experiences a greater surplus (or a lower decit) because while savings
and investment both decline, the former falls more.
Turning to the dynamic adjustment of stocks over time, the decline in the
returns to capital following a rise in the targeted level of reserves leads to capital
decumulation (equation (12)) and accumulation of nancial assets, that is, a
current account surplus (equation (15)). As capital decumulation proceeds, the
stock of capital falls, which magnies the initial decumulation (equation (12))
16See also Durdu et al. (ming).
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and current account surpluses (equation (15)). Notice that the condition for
the determinant of the system to be positive is that Kf <
K
f
. Thus, the higher
f is, and the lower K is, the greater the likelihood that the system is stable.
Intuitively, the greater the dampening e¤ect of a rise in the level of nancial
assets on the initial decumulation of capital, and the lower the sensitivity of
accumulation to the level of the capital stock (i.e., the Rybczynski e¤ect), the
more likely it is that the economy reaches a new steady state equilibrium with
a positive level of capital stock. In the alternative case where a saddle path
equilibrium exists, the initial capital accumulation gets magnied through the
dominant Rybczynski e¤ect and the capital stock vanishes unless something
guides the system to the new saddle path. Possible candidates are evolving
expectations or policy action. Graphically, both the _f = 0 and _K = 0 isoclines
shift to the right as a result of the decision to target higher reserves. Notice
that, since a decline in the real rate of return on capital has o¤setting e¤ects
on saving and investment, the former isocline shifts less in both the horizontal
and vertical directions.
In the stable case shown in Figure 10, the nancial stock is higher and the
capital stock lower at the new steady state. Capital decumulation is continuous
along the asymptotic adjustment path, while the current account experiences
continuous surpluses. A slower speed of adjustment of the current account may
lead to overshooting with current account surpluses and capital decumulation
followed by decits and capital accumulation.
In the knife-edge case, assuming that the economy jumps to the new saddle
path, the capital stock is higher while the nancial stock is lower at the new
steady state.
3.1.2 A policy-induced decline in private savings
A few Asian governments have introduced measures to boost private consump-
tion.17 A decline in savings can be modeled in our framework by a fall in an
autonomous component of savings. Since the equilibrium values of r, , and
b are determined independently of the level of current savings and investment,
these are unchanged. On the external front, a current account decit arises.
The dynamics of the adjustment to the new steady state are more involved.
The initial negative shock to savings results in nancial asset decumulation
through current account decits. The e¤ect of nancial asset decumulation on
capital accumulation is negative (f > 0 in equation (12)). The decline in
nancial and real asset stocks dampens the nancial decumulation (both due to
the Metzler e¤ect on savings and the increase in net savings following the decline
in real returns on capital). The current account decit shrinks as a result until
it turns into a surplus. As the stock of nancial assets rises beyond this point,
capital accumulation turns less negative (rf > 0) until the new steady state
is reached. Along the most direct path, the adjustment involves continuous
decumulation of real capital. The capital stock is lower and the nancial stock
17These measures have taken the form of handing out consumption coupons in some cases
including Korea and Taiwan.
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higher at the new steady state. In terms of Figure 11, the _f = 0 isocline shifts
to the left.18
3.1.3 A shift in preferences towards bonds
As international investors rush towards secure and liquid assets, mainly indus-
trialized country treasury bonds, a number of economists and policy makers
have in recent months expressed concern over the potential loss of developing
country access to international credit markets. Another interesting policy ex-
periment would, therefore, be the crowding out of emerging market investors
in international portfolio markets. Since we assume a constant level of central
bank reserve holdings with an endogenously adjusting supply of international
bonds to the private sector at a point in time, our framework does not allow
for analyzing supply constraints in the bond market unless we modify it. We
can, however, explore the problem from another angle. Suppose an excess de-
mand for bonds is created, not due to constrained supply, but rather due to
a shift in preferences toward international bonds. The immediate impact of
the excess demand for bonds created forces the monetary authority to tighten
capital controls. A lower return to real capital is now consistent with equity
market equilibrium, thanks to the capital controls. The dynamic adjustment
to and the qualitative nature of the new steady state will, therefore, be similar
to the case of increased reserve accumulation, and need not be discussed in any
detail here. Readers are instead directed to Section 3.1.1 for an analysis of the
dynamics involved. In the stable case, the composition of domestic portfolios
shifts towards nancial assets as the economy runs continuous current account
surpluses to satisfy the greater demand for foreign bonds.
3.1.4 An increase in risk-adjusted returns on international assets
Recent months have seen a rise in risk perceptions, and a resulting ight to
quality. An increase in the given yield on bonds, in our framework, has no
direct e¤ect on the money market. However, it does create excess demand for
bonds. Given its exchange rate and reserve targets, the monetary authority is
forced to tighten capital controls in order to o¤set the increased attractiveness
of foreign assets. More specically, the monetary authority will be forced to
raise the cost of foreign borrowing su¢ ciently to exactly o¤set the increased
attractiveness of international assets. The yield on domestic equity, and hence
its relative price, remains unchanged, which in turn means that savings and
accumulation remain una¤ected. No adjustment is required over time as long
as the reserve and exchange rate targets do not change.
18 In Case 2, where there is saddle path stability, f is relatively low and K relatively
large, so that capital decumulation continues even after the stock of nancial capital begins
to rise. Unless something guides the system to the new saddle path, the economy loses its
entire capital stock.
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4 Implications and Concluding Remarks
Before we expand on the implications of the thought experiments carried out
in the previous section, it is important to revisit some of the limitations of our
framework. Agents in our economy have access to only three assets: money,
bonds denominated in the international currency, and claims on real capital. In
particular, there are no domestic currency denominated bonds. Some analysts
such as Burger et al. (2009) attribute the absence, so far, of an Asian crisis-like
nancial collapse and currency run in emerging economies partly to the develop-
ment of such markets. The fact that bond prices are determined internationally
may be a good assumption for individual countries but perhaps less so for the
emerging country bloc as a whole. Our dynamics do not explicitly consider
the time variance of risk premia. Thus, we abstract away from some impor-
tant portfolio balance considerations. Central banks are assumed to target
monetary aggregates. In actual practice, many central banks target short-term
interest rates instead.19 Finally, the assumption regarding the non-tradable
nature of capital goods is questionable. This assumption is made mainly for
analytical convenience,20 but also because we dene capital to include build-
ings, infrastructure, and other kinds of capital that is not easily traded across
borders. Emerging economies are major exporters of consumer goods, but do
also trade signicantly in capital goods. In so far as these economies mostly
target consumer goods markets in industrial countries while purchasing a major
proportion of capital goods from each other, however, the assumption may still
be a good working hypothesis for the these countries as a bloc.
In spite of these limitations, our framework does allow us to explore some
interesting questions in a simple set-up where the central bank targets both
the exchange rate and the level of reserves. This set-up reects the widespread
belief that Central Banks in major emerging economies have, in recent years,
attempted to both maintain a competitive exchange rate and build a cushion
of foreign exchange reserves. The motives behind this behavior have been a
subject of much debate, with opinion split between those attributing it mainly
to precautionary versus mercantilist motives. From a broader perspective, how-
ever, these two motives should be seen as complementary targets. Mercantilist
objectives would require that the exchange rate be targeted at a competitive or
even undervalued level, while precautionary motives would require that foreign
exchange reserves provide an insurance against external and internal drains.
The exchange rate target facilitates achieving the reserve target. Achieving the
reserve target, on the other hand, makes it easier to stabilize the exchange rate
at a desired level, and to reduce problems arising from currency mismatches
on domestic balance sheets that often follow a sudden collapse of the exchange
rate in an economy with heavy liability dollarization. Put di¤erently, a massive
war chest of reserves may mitigate the fear of oatingby ensuring that the
19Although in the largest emerging economy in our sample, i.e., China, monetary authorities
do targer monetary aggregates.
20 It enables us to determine investment without having to make further constraining as-
sumptions.
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oating remains within a desirable range.
One way for central banks to respond to reigning international volatility and
uncertainty is to reinforce the re walls that they have so painstakingly built
up over the years. The monetary expansion resulting from an increase in the
reserve target of central banks requires tightening capital account restrictions
and a decline in equity returns in order to induce domestic residents to hold the
bigger stocks of real money balances. The rise in net savings generates a current
account surplus which is accompanied by o¤setting o¢ cial reserve transactions.
Since the return on real capital a¤ects both saving and investment, the compo-
sition of domestic wealth shifts towards nancial assets during the adjustment
to the new steady state in the stable case. The economy experiences continuous
current account surpluses along the asymptotic adjustment path.
A ight to quality towards international bonds would have a similar impact in
terms of how the economy adjusts to the new steady state. Both an increase in
the reserves target and an increase in private preference for international bonds
will have to be accompanied by tighter capital controls given the constraints
imposed by the policy targets.
Finally, lowering the domestic saving rate has a similar e¤ect in terms of
shifting the composition of domestic assets toward the nancial sector over time.
However, a key di¤erence lies in the fact that the initial current account decit
generated as a result of lower net savings helps avoid protectionist retaliation, at
least during the initial period of adjustment. Since the central bank maintains
its holdings of bonds, the private sector nances the additional spending and
current account decits by selling bonds. It is only the latter part of the
adjustment period that involves current account surpluses.
Thus, in almost all the cases formally considered, shocks in the presence of
exchange rate and reserve targeting translate into a shift in the structure of the
economy towards nancial assets. This nancialization could be seen as the
implicit counterpart to the de-nancialization that is likely required in industri-
alized countries, especially the ones that are responsible for the excess demand
side of global imbalances. However, the reserve and bond-related shocks also
involve continuous emerging country current account surpluses. This raises
broader questions about sustainability that we now briey turn to.
One way to pose the larger question is to recall that recovery in Asia from the
crisis in 1997-98 involved sustained current account surpluses and investment-
and export-led growth. The accompanying capital account surpluses meant that
central banks had to step in a major way to complement export acceleration
with reserve accumulation. Considering that foreign exchange reserves may
now be under pressure following an international ight to safety, and assuming
that recent events would bolster central banks desire to maintain a reserve
cushion, would a repeat of the last decade be feasible? In our simple framework,
emerging economies can only continue to target exchange rates and reserves
in most cases if they tighten capital controls while running continuous current
account surpluses accompanied by nancialization over time. With global trade
and capital ows unwinding, can this process be sustained?
The answer, as of now, seems to be no. Looming signs of rising unemploy-
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ment and political instability in several emerging economies put policy makers
under pressure to pursue the old path with renewed vigor. As unemployment
rises in the rest of the world, however, and governments come under increasing
pressures to protect the real sector, huge current account surpluses in emerging
economies - with exports and imports both growing, albeit at di¤erent speeds -
may be a relic of the past. As protectionist measures gain currency worldwide,
industrialized country markets are unlikely to provide the traction required for
emerging economy recovery in the near future. Thus, while it may be advanta-
geous for an emerging economy to simultaneously target reserve and exchange
rate levels with the help of capital controls, the world that is shaping around us
is unlikely to allow for a replay of the post-Asian crisis decade with huge global
imbalances emanating mainly from continuous current account surpluses on the
developing country side and decits on the US side. Moreover, capital controls
typically grow harder to maneuver with time, given technological and political
considerations, although arguably the economic case for these is quite strong.
What other options are left on the table? Given international monetary
conditions, monetary policy is not likely to play a signicant role in driving
long-term recovery, although given that major economies appear to be in a
situation approximating a liquidity trap, it may facilitate the path of scal pol-
icy. Furthermore, in our simple framework, monetary policy tends to create
continuous current account surpluses, which may be interpreted as a beggar-
thy-neighbor practice. Fiscal stimulus and a turn toward domestic demand-led
growth may be the most e¤ective option given the circumstances. Such a
stimulus helps to shift resources towards the non-tradable sector in developing
countries, and if globally coordinated, reduces the risk of beggar-thy-neighbor
policies in a traditional two-country Keynesian framework. In our simple model,
where the Central Bank puts a premium on exchange rate and reserve stability,
a scal stimulus in the form of consumption subsidies helps unwind global im-
balances by generating emerging country current account decits in the short
run. Finally, if the Central Bank targets the exchange rate, globally coordi-
nated scal policy becomes even more e¤ective in a Mundell-Fleming kind of
framework. It mitigates the need for competitive devaluations, generates em-
ployment while dampening external imbalances, and, to the extent that shifting
resources towards the non-tradable sector is incompatible with promoting indus-
trialization based on consumer goods industries,21 it limits negative long-term
consequences.22 Moreover, to the extent that their primary scal balances are
better than on the eve of the Asian crisis, emerging countries are in a much
better position to sustain an expansionary scal stance.
Over the longer horizon, a complementary approach would be the develop-
ment of international institutional arrangements that can mitigate the insurance
motive for reserve accumulation. The swap lines arranged between the US
Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the monetary authorities of
several emerging countries for the rst time during the current crisis have been
21Although in our simple framework, this implies greater production of capital goods, which
may not be an undesirable development.
22Since a coordinated stimulus limits relative price movements.
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a healthy development in this regard. In addition to increasing global dollar
liquidity, these have the added e¤ect of mitigating emerging economy central
bank concerns. The short-term liquidity facilities introduced by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund also help, albeit in a limited way, considering the gap
between the resources potentially required and those actually available. New
issuance of a globally acceptable non-dollar unit of account such as the IMFs
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) is a step in the right direction.
In conclusion, Bretton Woods II is unlikely to rise from the ashes. If we
assume that, (a) emerging economies, having concluded from recent global de-
velopments that policies adopted over the last decade have paid o¤, would want
to manage the level of their reserve holdings and exchange rates, and (b) the in-
dustrialized world, that is the region with large current account decits, is now
less willing or able to generate excess demand, two broad policy actions would
make sense. First, mitigating the mercantilist motive for targeting exchange
rates recommends the pursuit of globally coordinated scal stimuli. Second,
mitigating the precautionary motive for reserve accumulation strengthens the
case for international insurance in the form of (global or regional) currency swap
agreements, easier access to multilateral lending facilities, and greater regulation
of international capital ows. In the present circumstances, emerging economies
have a strong incentive to hold on to their reserves, since spending them may
lead to a crisis of condence. If the goal eventually is to put together a stable
international order that avoids the major pitfalls of Bretton Woods II, large
implicit guarantees in the form of a global lender of last resort (GLLR) may,
therefore, also be needed. In emerging economies, a GLLR has the added salu-
tary e¤ect, in addition to maintaining liquidity, of addressing currency-related
balance sheet mismatch problems. The devil, however, is in the details that
are beyond the scope of this preliminary exploration.
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Table 1: De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes as Classied by the International
Monetary Fund (July 31, 2006)
Regime No. of Ave. Res./GDP Countries
countries
Currency board 3 36.25 Hong Kong, Estonia, Lithuania
Pegging 7 21.57 China, Egypt, Hungary, Latvia,
Pakistan, Slovak Rep., Venezuela
Managed oating 9 39.53 Argentina, Colombia, Czech Rep.,
India, Malaysia,Peru, Russian Fed.,
Singapore, Thailand
Independently oating 10 14.83 Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Israel,
Korea, Rep., Mexico, the Philippines,
Poland, South Africa, Turkey
Table 2: Short-Run Comparative Statics
b  r
Rise in R   +  
Decline in  0 0 0
Rise in bd 0 +  
Rise in r 0 + 0
Rise in k 0 +=  +
Rise in f +   +
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Figure 1: Total current account (CA) and capital account (KA) balances of
emerging economies, 1996-2007.
Figure 2: Total reserves (left hand scale) and (unweighted) average reserve to



























































Figure 4: The Reserves-GDP ratio in 2007 versus the percentage nominal ex-
change rate change between December 2007 and November 2008
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Figure 5: The M2-Reserves ratio in 2007 versus the percentage nominal exchange
rate change between December 2007 and November 2008
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Figure 6: The average current account-GDP ratio over 2003-2007 versus the per-
centage nominal exchange rate change between December 2007 and November
2008
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Figure 7: The average capital account-GDP ratio over 2003-2007 versus the per-
centage nominal exchange rate change between December 2007 and November
2008
Figure 8: Case 1: Weak Rybczynski and Metzler e¤ects, respectively, on accu-
mulation and savings.
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Figure 9: Case 2: Strong Rybczynski and Metzler e¤ects, respectively, on
accumulation and savings.
Figure 10: An increase in the foreign exchange reserve target in Case 1
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Figure 11: A decline in private savings: Case 1
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